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In speaking of certain unpleasant conditions in the New York commercial theater—as opposed to the "secure" theater that might be created by endowed continuity—I happened to mention the plight of some of our best performers. An actress, I said, might have an enormous and thoroughly deserved success. She might then have another, perhaps a third—though with a little time out between them to search for scripts and bargain with commercial packagers. Then, I continued, she might easily hit a dead stretch, through no particular fault of her own. The right play might not come along; it might not be possible to cast properly a play she liked; any sort of foul wind might stop her dead in her tracks. At the height of her powers, and with her freshness due to decline yearly as freshness so disloyally does, she might spend as much as five seasons out of work. The waste is incredible. Yet that's the way the catch-as-catch-can commercial theater works, I concluded.

"But that's exactly what can happen in our theater!" a charming woman from Central Europe exclaimed. I was puzzled. Weren't the actors in her theater regularly employed? Yes, they were; once they'd graduated from the necessary preparatory school, and satisfactorily passed the tests imposed by the theatrical state board, they had jobs for life—or just about.

IN LIMBO

But my friend went on to explain. A girl out of school, a delightful ingénue, might join a company and work successfully, and frequently, for five or eight years. She would then be getting just a bit thready for ingénues, though not ample enough for character roles. She'd have arrived at a middle-ground "leading lady" position. Except that the company might already have an oversupply of "leading ladies," firmly entrenched and determined to stay that way until their wigs and chokers gave out. They were permanent, too, and had priority. The result: the maturing ingénue might not work now for as much as ten years—until someone conveniently died or until she turned into a crone who could be cast in bits. She'd be paid all this time, true. But it wasn't pay it was growth, we were talking about.

Another relatively young manager wanted out of state-subsidized repertory as fast as he could get out, though he had relatively few other places to go. He was fed up with the effects of security on his actors. They'd grown lazy, high-handed, reluctant to rehearse, and—what's more to the point—extremely unwilling to tackle roles they hadn't already established themselves in. They behaved both like stars and bureaucrats, he complained. They tended to stick to their bag of tricks; and they couldn't be budged because they couldn't be fired, they were office-holders.

Another kind of example. A director from behind an Iron Curtain country had, for a considerable time, been forced to do plays for the "workers," which meant old-line agit-prop plays imported from Russia or at the very least (very best, let's say), Brecht. "Finally," this director said, "I had to jump up and down and scream. I had to scream because the workers didn't like the plays and wouldn't come. I had to make the officials see that the actors became very discouraged playing to nobody." It seems that in this particular case the dictum from above was relaxed; the director had just finished doing "Luv," which the workers liked.

And there you are. Now none of this is to say that European municipal systems don't have their virtues. They have many. The most interesting practice, to me, was one pursued in Sweden. In certain cities there playwrights do not give any one theater an exclusive right to a play; there is no bidding for rights, as there is, say, in Prague. The playwright simply publishes his play, which means that it is now released to any management wishing to perform it. Six theaters may put it on simultaneously—and more or less *as written*. The author rarely bothers to go to rehearsals, though he may if he is asked. In due time he has six different opportunities to see his play differently done—and, obviously, his chances of getting a "right" production, and a success, out of so much independent activity are mightily increased. The future of his work isn't staked on a single "all or nothing" throw. If I were a playwright, and didn't need too much money, I'd move to Stockholm.

My purpose this morning, however, is neither to praise what is admirable nor fall back in mock astonishment at what is dismaying in the European methods we are striving so hard to copy. My purpose is to point out that credit *and* debits exist in any system, in all systems. Turn where you will, and dream as you may, the theater is going to grow thorns as well as rosebuds, and very often the thorns are going to be a necessary complement to the rosebuds. Good and ill come together, Helen of Troy must have had her flaws, anything we put hand to turns out to be a mixed blessing.

NO MAGIC WAND

The important thing is to know this, and not to imagine that heaven hovers somewhere just beyond a big enough endowment or near a greenroom in which all of the actors are knee-deep in social security. Such disappointment as we feel whenever a new crisis turns up in Philadelphia or New Haven is due to our having supposed that one last benevolent gesture would do the trick, that a sufficient supply of goodwill would corral perfection forever. We can't imagine serpents in Eden because we are still innocents about the theater: we do expect the good, the true, and the beautiful to flow immediately and without embarrassing interruption from our having made such an effort and having had such good intentions. We've had noble thoughts; why can't playwrights and playhouses, directors and prima donnas, live up to them?

I think that if we tighten our belts a bit against the possibility of not getting an instant full meal, if we agree to acknowledge the fact that every plan devised by mortal man breeds its own form of discontent, if we agree to junk the illusion that the wave of a magic wand will somewhere bring an altogether untroublesome, altogether uncorrupted kind of theater into existence, we'll find ourselves in better shape to deal with the slings and arrows that do seem to impede progress.

When we learn to stop idealizing any one sort of practice, and begin to be tough-minded about the dirty tricks of fate we may expect everywhere, we will not be so discouraged by occasional bulletins from the front. Even when we get what we want, we'll find it in some ways wanting. All right, so be it. Thus armed, we may get on with it. It is the realist, not the idealist, who is able to keep his spirits up.

PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S ADDRESS BEFORE THE TENNESSEE LEGISLATURE

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. Mr. President, the address yesterday by the President of the United States before the Tennessee Legislature is a significant one—and one that should be pondered carefully by the American people.

President Johnson marshaled the facts regarding Vietnam, and in language more forceful than ever before, he asserted the determination of the United States to achieve an honorable peace in southeast Asia.

The President made clear that—

We do not want permanent bases. We will begin withdrawal of our troops . . . whenever reciprocal concessions are forthcoming from our adversary.

With reference to the bombing of military targets in North Vietnam, he reported—

The firm belief of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Central Intelligence Agency, and all the sources of information and advice at my command that the bombing is causing serious disruption and added expense to the North Vietnamese infiltration effort.

The President emphasized, too, what so many of his critics overlook:

The strength of Communist main force units in the south are clearly based on infiltration from the north.

Frequently on the floor of the Senate I have contended that so long as we have great masses of American military personnel in South Vietnam, our Government is obligated to give them full support by seeking the elimination of meaningful military targets in North Vietnam.

President Johnson put it this way in the most significant sentence of his significant speech:

It is simply unfair to American—and Vietnamese—soldiers to ask them to face increased enemy personnel and firepower without making an effort to reduce that infiltration.

That sentence, I feel, should be repeated again and again. The President's words were simple ones, but vital ones.

I commend the President for the clarity in which he stated the case, and I concur in his assertion that it is unfair to our soldiers to ask them to face increased enemy action without making full effort to reduce enemy military capabilities.

I feel absolutely certain that no man in our Nation desires peace more than does the President. It is he who daily must make the agonizing decisions which mean life or death to so many Americans.

I commend the President, too, for his appointment of the distinguished diplomat, Mr. Ellsworth Bunker, as our Ambassador to the Government of South Vietnam. Ambassador Bunker through the years has rendered able and devoted service, and the experience he has acquired on five continents should mean much to our Nation as he faces the difficult assignment at Saigon.

I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD the text of the President's address delivered yesterday at Nashville, Tenn.

There being no objection, the address was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

PRESIDENT'S REMARKS TO TENNESSEE LEGISLATURE

Following is a text of President Johnson's prepared remarks before a joint session of the Tennessee Legislature:

It is always a special pleasure for me to visit Tennessee.

For a Texan, it is like a homecoming. Much of the courage and hard work that went into the building of the Southwest came from [illegible] of Tennessee. [illegible] thousands of men—at the Alamo, at San Jacinto and in the homes of a pioneer people.

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This morning I visited the Hermitage, the historic home of Andrew Jackson. Two centuries have passed since that most American of Americans was born. The world has changed much since his day. But the qualities which sustain men and nations in positions of leadership have not changed.

In our time as in Jackson's, freedom has its price.

In our time as in his, history conspires to test the American will.

In our time as in his, courage, vision and the willingness to sacrifice will sustain the cause of freedom.

IMPRINT MADE

This generation of Americans is making its imprint on history in the fierce hills and sweltering jungles of Vietnam. I think most of our citizens have—after a penetrating debate which is our democratic heritage—reached a common understanding on the meaning and objectives of that struggle.

Before I discuss the specific questions that remain at issue, let me review the points of widespread agreement.

Two years ago we were forced to choose between major commitments in defense of South Vietnam and retreat:

The evacuation of more than 25,000 of our troops,

The collapse of the Republic of Vietnam in the face of subversion and external assault.

Andrew Jackson would not have been surprised at our choice.

We chose a course in keeping with our tradition, with the foreign policy of three Administrations, with the expressed will of Congress, with our solemn obligations under the Southeast Asian Treaty, and with the interests of 16 million South Vietnamese who had to wish to live under communist domination.

VOICES RAISED

As our commitment in Vietnam required more men and equipment, some voices were raised in opposition. The Administration was urged to disengage, to find an excuse to abandon the effort.

These cries came despite growing evidence that the defense of Vietnam held the key to the political and economic future of free Asia. The stakes of the struggle grew correspondingly.

It became clear that if we were prepared to stay the course in Vietnam, we could help to lay the cornerstone for a diverse and independent Asia, full of promise and resolute in the cause of peaceful economic development for her long-suffering peoples.

But if we faltered, the forces of chaos would scent victory and decades of strife and aggression would stretch endlessly before us.

The choice was clear. We would stay the course. And we shall stay the course.

I think most Americans support this fundamental decision. Most of us remember the fearful cost of ignoring aggression. Most of us have cast aside the illusion that we can live in an affluent fortress while th world slides into chaos.

BASIC OBJECTIVES

I think we have also reached broad agreement on our basic objectives in Vietnam.

First, an honorable peace that will leave the people of South Vietnam free to fashion their own political and economic institutions without fear of terror or intimidation from the North.

Second, a Southeast Asia in which all countries—including a peaceful North Vietnam—apply their scarce resources to the real problems of their people: combating hunger, ignorance and disease.

I have said many times that nothing would give us greater pleasure than to invest our own resources in the constructive works of peace rather th[illegible] war.

Third, a concrete demonstration that aggression across international frontiers is no longer an acceptable means of political change.

There is also a general agreement among Americans on the things we do not want in Vietnam.

We do not want permanent bases. We will begin withdrawal of our troops on a reasonable schedule whenever reciprocal concessions are forthcoming from our adversary.

We do not seek to impose our political beliefs upon South Vietnam. Our republic rests upon a brisk commerce in ideas. We will be happy to see free competition in the intellectual marketplace whenever North Vietnam is willing to shift the conflict from the battlefield to the ballot box.

These are the broad principles on which most Americans agree.

QUESTIONS ARISE

On a less general level, however, the events and frustrations of these past few difficult weeks have inspired a number of questions about our Vietnam policy in the minds and hearts of many of our citizens. Today I want to deal with some of those questions that figure most prominently in the press and the many letters which reach my desk.

Many Americans are confused by the barrage of information about military engagements. They long for the capsule summary which has kept tabs on previous wars, a line on the map dividing friends from foe.

Precisely what, they ask, is our military situation, and what are the prospects for victory?

The first answer is that Vietnam is aggression in a new guise, as far removed from trench warfare as the rifle from the longbow. This is a war of infiltration, of subversion, of ambush. Pitched battles are rare, and even more rarely decisive.

Today, more than 1 million men from the Republic of Vietnam and its six allies are engaged in the order of battle.

Despite massive increases in North Vietnam infiltration, this strengthening of allied forces in 1966 was instrumental in reversing the whole course of the war:

We estimate that 55,000 North Vietnamese and Vietcong were killed in 1966, compared with 35,000 the previous year. Many more were wounded, and more than 20,000 defected.

By contrast, 9,500 South Vietnamese, 5,000 Americans and 600 from other allied forces were killed in action.

The Vietnamese army achieved a 1966 average of 2 weapons captured from the Vietcong to every one lost, a dramatic turn around from the previous two years.

Allied forces have made several successful sweeps through territories that were considered Vietcong sanctuaries only a short time ago. These operations not only cost the enemy large numbers of men and weapons, but are very damaging to his morale.

RESULTS PRODUCED

What does this mean?

Will the North Vietnamese change tactics? Will there be less infiltration of main units and more guerrilla warfare?

The truth is we don't know.

What we do know is that our strategy has produced results, that our military position has substantially improved, and that our military success has permitted the groundwork to be laid for a pacification program which is the long-run key to an independent South Vietnam.

Since February, 1965, our military operations have included selective bombing of military targets in North Vietnam. Our purposes are three:

To back our fighting men by denying the enemy a sanctuary.

To exact a penalty against North Vietnam [illegible] cords of 1954 and 1962.

To limit the flow, or substantially increase the cost of infiltration of men and materiel from North Vietnam.

Our intelligence confirms that we have been successful.

MUST WE BOMB?

Yet, some object strongly to this aspect of our policy. Must we bomb? They ask. Does it do any military good? Is it consistent with our limited objectives? Is it an inhuman act aimed at civilians?

On the question of military utility, I can only report the firm belief of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Central Intelligence Agency, and all the sources of information and advice at my command that the bombing is causing serious disruption and added expense to the North Vietnamese infiltration effort.

We know, for example, that half a million people are kept busy just repairing bomb damage to bridges, roads, railroads and other strategic facilities, and in air and coastal defense.

I also want to say categorically that it is not the position of your Government that the bombing will be decisive in getting Hanoi to abandon aggression. It has, however, created substantial problems for them. The best indication of how substantial is the fact that they are working so hard to get us to stop.

The bombing is entirely consistent with our limited objectives in South Vietnam. The strength of Communist main-force units in the South is clearly based on infiltration from the North. It is simply unfair to American—and Vietnamese—soldiers to ask them to face increased enemy personnel and firepower without making an effort to reduce that infiltration.

CIVILIANS IN WAR

As for bombing civilians, I would simply say that we are making an effort unprecedented in the history of warfare to be sure that we do not. It is our policy to bomb military targets only.

We have never deliberately bombed cities, nor attacked any target with the purpose of inflicting civilian casualties.

We recognize, and regret, that some people living and working in the vicinity of military targets have suffered.

We also are all too aware that men and machines are not infallible, and that some mistakes have occurred.

But our record on this account is, in my opinion, highly defensible.

Look for a moment at the record of the other side.

Any civilian casualties that result from our operations are inadvertent, in stark contrast to the calculated Vietcong policy of sysmatic terror.

Tens of thousands of innocent Vietnamese civilians have been killed, tortured and kidnaped by the Vietcong. There is no doubt about the deliberate nature of this program. One need only note the frequency with which Vietcong victims are village leaders, teachers, health workers and others trying to carry out constructive programs.

Yet the deeds of the Vietcong go largely unnoted in the public debate. It is this moral double bookkeeping which makes us weary of some of our critics.

NEGATIVE RESPONSE

But there is another question: Why don't we stop bombing to make it easier for them to begin negotiations?

The answer is:

• We stopped for 5 days and 20 hours in May, 1965. Representatives of Hanoi simply returned our message in a plain envelope.

• We stopped bombing for 36 days and 15 hours in December, 1965, and January, 1966. They replied: "A political settlement of the Vietnam problem can be envisaged only when [illegible] the four-point stand of the government of

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the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, has proved this by actual deeds, has stopped unconditionally and for good its air raids and all other acts of war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam."

• Last month we stopped bombing for 5 days and 18 hours, after many prior weeks in which we had communicated to them several possible routes to peace, any one of which we were prepared to take. Their response, as delivered to His Holiness the Pope, was this: The United States "must put an end to their aggression in Vietnam, end unconditionally and definitively the bombing and all other acts of war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, withdraw from South Vietnam all American and satellite troops, recognize the South Vietnam National Front for Liberation, and let the Vietnamese people settle themselves their own affairs."

That is where we now stand.

They have three times rejected a bombing pause as a means to open the way to ending the war.

FURTHER TRAGEDY

The tragedy of South Vietnam is not limited to casualty lists.

There is much tragedy in the story of a nation at war for nearly a generation. It is the story of economic stagnation. It is the story of a generation of young men—the flower of the labor force—pressed into military service by one side or the other.

No one denies that the survival of South Vietnam is heavily dependent upon early economic progress.

My most recent hopeful report of progress in this area came from an old friend of the Tennessee Valley—David Lilienthal, who recently went to Vietnam to work with the Vietnamese on economic planning.

He reported—with some surprise, I might add—that he discovered an extraordinary air of confidence among farmers, village leaders, trade unionists and industrialists. He concluded that their economic behavior suggests "that they think they know how this all is going to come out."

Mr. Lilienthal also said that the South Vietnamese were among the hardest working people he had seen in developing countries around the world. That "to have been through 20 years of war and still have this amount of 'zip' almost ensures their long-term economic development."

Our AID programs are also supporting the drive toward a sound economy.

But none of these economic accomplishments will be decisive in itself. And no economic achievement can substitute for a strong and free political structure.

We cannot build such a structure—only the Vietnamese can do that.

And they are. As I am talking to you here, a freely elected Constituent Assembly in Saigon is wrestling with the last details of a new constitution, one which will bring the Republic of Vietnam to full membership among the democratic nations of the world.

In the midst of war, they have been building for peace and justice. That is a remarkable accomplishment in the annals of mankind.

OBSERVATIONS OF A PARTICIPANT IN VIETNAMESE AFFAIRS

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, in view of this body's continuing commitment to a searching analysis of all the complex facets of our southeast Asian policy, I would like to share with other Senators the views of a man whom I regard as a thoughtful and well-informed observer of and participant in Vietnamese affairs.

I speak of Brig Gen. B. B. Talley, U.S. Army, retired, of Mangum, Okla. For many recent months General Talley has been in Vietnam in charge of a group of engineers doing contract work for the Navy He feels strongly, as many of us feel, that Americans must be fully advised about the scope of our stake in Asia.

I therefore ask unanimous consent that there be printed in the RECORD excerpts from a letter he has written to me, and I commend his straight-from-the-shoulder comments to the attention of the Senate and of all Americans.

There being no objection, the excerpts were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

EXCERPTS FROM LETTER OF BRIG. GEN. B. B. TALLEY

I have been in Vietnam for nearly eighteen months in charge of a group of engineers under contract to the U.S. Navy.

We are winning this war politically, socially, and economically, as well as militarily. We should be permitted to fight it to a successful conclusion. You may rest assured if the Communists ever come to a conference table it will be under circumstances which they consider advantageous.

A truce right now would mean defeat. Ho Chi Minh was given to understand at the conclusion of the Geneva Conference in 1954 that he would have South Vietnam within two years. He dispersed his forces and left them here where they continued to control vast areas of the country. They have worked assiduously to subvert the people and are responsible for the present condition in South Vietnam. A truce at this time would open the door for further subversion and they would undo what we have accomplished and all our trouble and effort would come to naught.

What we need is time. Give us two years more; some say three; and we can build a nation here which can, with our help, stand on its own feet. The situation here is much brighter for building an independent nation than it was in South Korea in 1945. You have only to contrast the present conditions during this New Year's Festival Season with what it was a year ago. You can see how much has been accomplished and how rapidly progress is being made. A year ago, fear was written in the faces of the people. This year they are relaxed and are beginning to see a ray of hope. A truce would mean surrender.

POVERTY BLIGHT AND WASTE OF HUMAN RESOURCES

Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, I strongly support the goals expressed in the President's message on America's unfinished business. Its core theme is the imperative need for an even greater effort to overcome poverty, blight, and the waste of precious human resources. Much progress has been made against poverty through the economic opportunity programs authorized by the Congress a short two and a half years ago. But much more is necessary. I am convinced that now more than ever the need is to persevere and redouble our efforts.

The best current estimate is that 32.7 million Americans live in conditions of poverty. Of this number, over 9 million have already been reached by community action programs, which are operating in over 1,000 communities from coast to coast. Over 800,000 of the 4.1 million young people, between the ages [illegible] have been able to participate in the Neighborhood Youth Corps. Over 54,000 of these young people, by the end of this fiscal year, will have been successfully trained for good jobs and decent, productive lives through the Job Corps. Approximately 14,000 previously unemployed adults, whose families were receiving welfare payments, have been provided useful work experience and training under title V of the Economic Opportunity Act; 87,000 persons in 23,000 families are benefitting from rural opportunity loans under title III to combat poverty in rural America.

These figures tell a good deal, but they do not come close to revealing what a tremendous impact economic opportunity programs have had upon human lives in countless thousands of local antipoverty encounters. They do not reflect the immense boost in life which Headstart gives a little child from a poor family—or which upward bound gives to that child's teenage brother or sister—or which a legal services project of a neighborhood health center can give to an entire family—or which a foster grandparents project gives to a lonely and poor elderly person as well as to the institutionalized child in his or her care.

Dry statistics do not begin to tell the story of the transformations being wrought on Indian reservations, in migrant workers camps, in Appalachian hollows and in urban slums by the economic opportunity programs launched just a little over 2 years ago. Nor do they begin to account for the tremendous commitment which American industry, civic and professional leaders, public officials, private groups and religious organizations have made to victory in the war on poverty. America has been aroused, and alerted as to the presence of poverty in our midst and the imperative need to overcome it.

The "unfinished business" to which the President refers involves an expansion of our national effort to help our less fortunate fellow citizens help themselves out of poverty, out of undereducation, out of blighted neighborhoods, out of joblessness, hopelessness, and social alienation, and into the mainstream of American prosperity and American democracy.

OMBUDSMAN

Mr. LONG of Missouri. Mr. President interest in the subject of ombudsman is evident from the many news articles and editorials which daily are coming across my desk.

I ask unanimous consent to have printed at this point in the RECORD a column entitled "For the Ombudsman, a Hearty Skoal," published in the December 16, 1966, issue of Life magazine.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From Life magazine, Dec. 16, 1966]

FOR THE OMBUDSMAN, A HEARTY SKOAL

(By Loudon Wainwright)

Help Wanted: Senior citizen in good health and full vigor. Must have impeccable standing in community, legal background preferred. Should be able to regard [illegible] officials with cool detachment and to cast a critical eye on

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